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긴급도 14/100 심각도 5.5 · 보통 악용확률 6.1%

CVE-2025-38721

Qualys 위협 인텔 · 심각도 5/5 · QID 591802 · ICS
공개 익스플로잇 권한상승 인증 불필요 원격코드실행 CISA KEV
  • CVSS Temporal 8.8 (현재 위협 반영)
  • 익스플로잇 성숙도: PoC (2/4)
  • 공격 위치: 원격
  • 패치: 가능
  • 익스플로잇 프레임워크: GitHub
  • PCI-DSS 관련
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfilter: ctnetlink: fix refcount leak on table dump

There is a reference count leak in ctnetlink_dump_table():
if (res < 0) {
nf_conntrack_get(&ct->ct_general); // HERE
cb->args[1] = (unsigned long)ct;
...

While its very unlikely, its possible that ct == last.
If this happens, then the refcount of ct was already incremented.
This 2nd increment is never undone.

This prevents the conntrack object from being released, which in turn
keeps prevents cnet->count from dropping back to 0.

This will then block the netns dismantle (or conntrack rmmod) as
nf_conntrack_cleanup_net_list() will wait forever.

This can be reproduced by running conntrack_resize.sh selftest in a loop.
It takes ~20 minutes for me on a preemptible kernel on average before
I see a runaway kworker spinning in nf_conntrack_cleanup_net_list.

One fix would to change this to:
if (res < 0) {
if (ct != last)
nf_conntrack_get(&ct->ct_general);

But this reference counting isn't needed in the first place.
We can just store a cookie value instead.

A followup patch will do the same for ctnetlink_exp_dump_table,
it looks to me as if this has the same problem and like
ctnetlink_dump_table, we only need a 'skip hint', not the actual
object so we can apply the same cookie strategy there as well.
타임라인
  1. NVD 공개
  2. 첫 보도 CISA Advisories · 지멘스 SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518(F)-4 PN/DP MFP

벡터: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

NVD 상세 ↗   GitHub Advisory ↗   참고 링크 ↗

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